Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases by Lande, Robert H. & Davis, Joshua P.
Articles
Benefits From Private Antitrust
Enforcement: An Analysis
of Forty Cases
By ROBERT H. LANDE & JOSHUA P. DAvIs*
Introduction
THIS STUDY TAKES A first step toward providing an empirical basis
for assessing whether private enforcement of the antitrust laws serves
its intended purposes and is in the public interest. It does this by as-
sembling, aggregating, and analyzing information about forty of the
largest recent successful private antitrust cases.' This information in-
cludes, inter alia, (1) the amount of money each action recovered for
the victims of each alleged antitrust violation, (2) what proportion of
the money was recovered from foreign entities, (3) whether govern-
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ment action preceded the private litigation, (4) the attorney's fees
awarded to plaintiffs' counsel, (5) on whose behalf money was recov-
ered (direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor), and
(6) the kind of claim the plaintiffs asserted (rule of reason, per se, or
a combination of the two). The Study also draws various comparisons
between the deterrence effects of private enforcement and federal
criminal enforcement of the antitrust laws. First, it compares the total
monetary amounts paid in all forty cases to the total criminal antitrust
fines imposed during the same period by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice ("DOJ"). Next, it makes that same comparison for the subset of
the forty cases that also resulted in criminal penalties. Finally, the
Study takes into account the deterrence effects of the prison
sentences that resulted from DOJ prosecutions during this period.
This Study analyzes the collected information to help formulate
policy conclusions about the desirability and efficacy of private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws. The results of the Study show that
private antitrust enforcement helps the economy in many ways. It very
significantly compensates victims of illegal corporate behavior and is
almost always the only way these victims can receive redress. Private
enforcement often prevents foreign corporations from keeping the
many billions of dollars they illegally obtain from individual and cor-
porate purchasers in the United States. This Study also shows that al-
most half of the underlying violations were first uncovered by private
attorneys, not government enforcers, and that litigation in many other
cases had a mixed public/private origin. The results of the Study also
show that private litigation probably does more to deter antitrust viola-
tions than all the fines and incarceration imposed as a result of crimi-
nal enforcement by the DOJ. This is one of the most surprising results
from our Study. We do not know of any past study that has docu-
mented that private enforcement has such a significant deterrence ef-
fect as compared to DOJ criminal enforcement.
Part I explores the purposes of private enforcement of the anti-
trust laws, including compensation and deterrence. Part II sets forth
some of the typical criticisms of private enforcement, criticisms which
generally lack any empirical basis. Part III explains the purpose of this
Study-to provide some factual basis for assessing private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws-and also its design. Part IV presents the
results of this Study, which support some surprising conclusions, per-
haps most notably that private antitrust enforcement provides a
greater deterrence effect than criminal enforcement by the DOJ.
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I. The Purposes of Private Enforcement and Private
Remedies
The federal antitrust laws prohibit violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.2 These violations include price fixing, bid rigging, mar-
ket and customer divisions, and other collective anticompetitive be-
havior. 3 Federal antitrust laws also prohibit violations of section 2 of
the Sherman Act,4 which include monopolization, attempts to monop-
olize, and conspiracies to monopolize any part of the trade or the
commerce of the United States, 5 as well as mergers, the effect of
which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly."'6 Some offenses, like price fixing and bid rigging, are
per se offenses while others, including monopolization, are governed
by the rule of reason. 7 If conduct is per se illegal, proof of the conduct
itself establishes a violation of the law.8 Under the rule of reason, in
contrast, courts will compare the procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects of the conduct to determine its legality.9 Antitrust laws can be
enforced by government prosecutors (the DOJ, 10 the Federal Trade
Commission"' ("FTC"), and state enforcers12) and also by aggrieved
private parties. 13
The legislative history' 4 and case law' 5 interpreting the federal
antitrust laws indicate that one important goal of the laws is to com-
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
3. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTE-
GRATED HANDBOOK 165-285 (West Group ed., 2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
5. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 3, at 71-140; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 18; see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 3, at 510-34.
7. For a fuller discussion of the distinction between per se and rule of reason cases,
see SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 3, at 202-17.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 15(f).
11. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") enforces the Federal Trade Commission
Act which prohibits, inter alia, "unfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45. This provi-
sion is similar to the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. See generally Neil W. Averitt, The Mean-
ing of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L.
REV. 227 (1980) (explaining precisely how the FTC Act is similar to but slightly broader
than the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c).
13. Id. § 15.
14. Senator Coke complained about a bill that would have provided only for double
damages:
How would a citizen who has been plundered in his family consumption of sugar
by the sugar trust . . . recover his damages under that clause? It is simply an
impossible remedy offered him .... [H]ow could the consumers of the articles
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
pensate victims of illegal behavior. 16 Moreover, their primary goal is to
prevent wealth transfers from these victims to firms with market
power,17 a concept that is consistent with and complementary to the
goal of compensating overcharged victims of antitrust violations. To
be sure, Congress's decision to award treble damages18 might suggest
that at least two-thirds of the damages remedy was intended only for
punitive or deterrence purposes. It is possible, however, that even this
produced by these trusts, the great mass of our people-the individuals-go
about showing the damages they had suffered? How would they establish the
damage which they had sustained so as to get ajudgment under this bill? I do not
believe they could do it.
21 CONG. REC. 2615 (1890).
Representative Webb stated that the damages provision "opens the door ofjustice to every
man whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws and gives the
injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered." 51 CONG. REc. 9073 (1914). He also
stated that "we are liberalizing the procedure in the courts in order to give the individual
who is damaged the right to get his damages anywhere-anywhere you can catch the of-
fender." Id. at 16,274; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 21-30 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("[The treble damages
remedy was passed] as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from
price fixing."). A large number of Supreme Court cases hold that both deterrence and
compensation are purposes of the treble damages remedy. See Ad. Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328, 360 n.20 (1990); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102
(1989); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 557 (1982);
Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); Il. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746,
748, 749 (1977); Former Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969).
16. See Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1976) ("Treble-
damages antitrust actions... [were] conceived of primarily as a remedy for [t] he people of
the United States as individuals, especially consumers .... Treble damages were provided
in part for punitive purposes ... but also to make the remedy meaningful by counterbal-
ancing the difficulty of maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is de-
scribed in the Act." (internal quotations and citations to legislative history quoting
Senators Sherman and George omitted)).
17. Many statements by the Sherman Act's sponsors about the overall purpose of the
proposed legislation suggest that their primary concern was that firms might use market
power to increase prices to consumers. For example, Senator Sherman termed monopolis-
tic overcharges "extortion which makes the people poor," and "extorted wealth." Robert H.
Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL.
429, 449 (1988) (citations omitted). Congressman Coke referred to the overcharges as
"robbery." Id. Representative Heard declared that the trusts, "without rendering the slight-
est equivalent," have "stolen untold millions from the people." Id. Congressman Wilson
complained that a particular trust "robs the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on
the other." Id. Representative Fithian declared that the trusts were "impoverishing" the
people through "robbery." Id, Senator Hoar declared that monopolistic pricing was "a
transaction the direct purpose of which is to extort from the community.., wealth which
ought to be generally diffused over the whole community." Id. at 449-50. Senator George
complained, "They aggregate to themselves great enormous wealth by extortion which
makes the people poor." Id. at 50.
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
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portion is necessary to compensate plaintiffs for the difficulty of bring-
ing suit,19 for unawarded prejudgment interest,20 and for difficult-to-
quantify unawarded damages items such as the allocative inefficiency
effects of market power and the value of plaintiffs' time expended
pursuing litigation.21 Antitrust verdicts that produce treble damages
are rare,22 and we believe that few, if any, of the many antitrust cases
that settle do so for more than single damages. 23 Of course, private
enforcement also serves to deter antitrust violations.24
II. Criticisms of Private Enforcement
While government criminal and civil actions are essential in de-
terring future antitrust violations, virtually the only way to secure re-
dress for the victims of antitrust violations is through private
19. Senator Sherman observed, "[t]he measure of damages, whether merely compen-
satory, putative [sic], or vindictive, is a matter of detail depending upon the judgment of
Congress. My own opinion is that the damages should be commensurate with the difficulty
of maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is described." 21 CONG. REc.
2456 (1890). Representative Webb stated, "Under the civil remedies any man throughout
the United States, hundreds and thousands, can bring suit in the various jurisdictions, and
thus the offender will begin to open his eyes because you are threatening to take money
out of his pocket." Id. at 16,275.
20. Damages should include victims' lost prejudgment interest, the lack of which
often can reduce the value of an antitrust damages award by fifty percent. See Robert H.
Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 130-36,
158-68 (1993).
21. As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted: "Indeed, in light of the fact
that some damages may not be recoverable (e.g., compensation for interest prior to judg-
ment, or because of the statute of limitations and the inability to recover 'speculative'
damages) treble damages help ensure that victims will receive at least their actual dam-
ages." ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 246 (2007)
[hereinafter AMC REPORT] (citation omitted), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
amc/reportrecommendation/amcjfinal_report.pdf. To the extent the purpose of the
remedy is compensation, the damages caused by an antitrust violation should consist of the
sum of all relatively predictable harms caused by that violation affecting anyone other than
the defendants. Damages should include the wealth transferred from consumers to the
violator(s), as well as the allocative inefficiency effects felt by society, whether caused di-
rectly, or indirectly via "umbrella" effects. Plaintiffs' attorney's fees, the value of plaintiffs'
time spent pursuing the case, and the cost to the American taxpayer of administering the
judicial system should also be included. When all these adjustments are made it is likely
that antitrust's "treble" damages remedy actually is less than single damages, See Lande,
supra note 20, at 122-24, 158-68.
22. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices ? Implica-
tions for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REv. 513 app. at 565 (2005), for a list of antitrust
verdicts that calculated damages amounts.
23. See Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 Loy. CON-
SUMER L. REv. 329 (2004), for an analysis of this issue.
24. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977).
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litigation.25 And, as we explore below, private enforcement also plays a
significant role in deterring antitrust violations. This Study attempts to
provide an empirical basis for assessing these benefits. Before doing
so, however, it is worthwhile to canvass some of the criticisms of pri-
vate enforcement of the antitrust laws. Indeed, detractors of private
enforcement seem to greatly outnumber its supporters, even if those
detractors rarely provide any empirical basis for their position.
Many commentators have criticized the existing system of private
antitrust litigation. Some assert that private actions too often result in
remedies that provide lucrative attorney's fees but secure no real ben-
efits for overcharged purchasers. 26 Others suggest that private class
actions often follow an easy trail blazed by government enforcers and
that, as a result, private actions add much less than they should to
government enforcement. 27 Still others contend that private antitrust
damages lead to excessive deterrence in light of government sanc-
25. State Attorneys General can bring parens patria actions on behalf of victims lo-
cated within their states. The FTC has succeeded in disgorgement actions, but these ac-
tions are rare compared to private actions. See generally PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST
LAW 302, at 23-26 (2008) (explaining the problems with disgorgement).
26. This belief was ably summarized by Professor Cavanagh:
Many class action suits generate substantial fees for counsel but produce little, if
any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdoing. Coupon settlements,
wherein plaintiffs settle for "cents off" coupons while their attorneys are paid
their full fees in cash fall within this category. Coupon settlements may take the
form of a discount certificate on future purchases from defendants, or, as in the
case of airlines, a right to discounts on future travel. Coupon settlements are of
dubious value to the victims of antitrust violations .... Clearly, the types of cou-
pon settlements described here, which are not atypical, confer no real benefits on
the plaintiffs. Equally important, defendants are not forced to disgorge their ill-
gotten gains when coupons are not redeemed. In such situations, it is difficult to
justify paying attorneys their full fees in cash, instead of in kind.
Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REv. 147, 214 (2005) (citation
omitted). Professor Cavanagh, however, provides only an anecdote to support these con-
clusions. He makes no effort to assess whether the types of settlements he describes are in
fact "not atypical." Id. He provides no data to show how often antitrust class action cases
result in useless coupons.
27. John C. Coffee, Jr., at one point, subscribed to this view. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr.,
Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Work-
ing, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 223-26 (1983). Coffee later concluded, however, that the evidence
was to the contrary in antitrust cases. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 n.36 (1986) ("Although the conventional
wisdom has long been that class actions tend to 'tag along' on the heels of governmentally
initiated suits, a recent study of antitrust litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has
placed this figure at '[1]ess than 20% of private antitrust actions filed between 1976 and
1983.'" (citations omitted)).
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tions. 2 8 Indeed, one common criticism of private actions in general-
and of class actions in particular-is that they are a form of blackmail
or extortion, one in which plaintiffs' attorneys, with little risk to them-
selves, coerce defendants into settlements based not on meritorious
claims, but rather on the cost of litigation or fear of an erroneous and
catastrophic judgment.29 These actions also serve to discourage legiti-
28. An example of an argument, without empirical evidence, that criminal fines and
prison terms reduce the need for treble damages in antitrust class actions is found in David
Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency Enforce-
ment of Antitrust Law, 2J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 159, 162 (2006). See Robert H. Lande,
Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 651, 669-73 (2006), for an argument
that treble damages do not lead to excessive deterrence and in fact should be increased
further.
As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted: "[Slome have argued that treble dam-
ages, along with other remedies, can overdeter some conduct that may not be anticompeti-
tive and result in duplicative recovery. No actual cases or evidence or systematic
overdeterrence were presented to the Commission, however." AMC REPORT, supra note 21,
at 247 (citation omitted).
29. See Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance and Future of American Antitrust Pol-
icy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 811-12 (1987); see alsoJOHN H. BEISNER & CHARLES E. BORDEN,
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, EXPANDING PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACrION: LESSONS FROM THE U.S.
LITIGATION EXPERIENCE (2005) [hereinafter BEISNER & BORDEN, EXPANDING], available at
http://instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/issue.cfm?doctype=STU&page=8 (follow "Ex-
panding Private Causes of Action: Lessons from the U.S. Litigation Experience (PDF, 116
Kb)" hyperlink);JoHN H. BEISNER & CHARLES E. BORDEN, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ON THE
ROAD TO LITIGATION ABUSE: THE CONTINUING EXPORTATION OF U.S. CLASS ACTIONS AND
ANTITRUST LAW (2006) [hereinafter BEISNER & BORDEN, EXPORTATION], available at http://
instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/docload.cfm?docld=1061. Moreover, the argument
runs, the plaintiffs' attorneys-particularly class counsel-settle cases in a way that lines
their pockets but provides no meaningful compensation to the injured plaintiffs. Id. How-
ever, those who embrace this view provide no systematic empirical basis for its factual
predicates.
Consider the claim that the costs of discovery for plaintiffs are trivial but can be exorbitant
for defendants. See BEISNER & BORDEN, EXPANDING, supra, at 16. Beisner and Borden make
this assertion but offer no evidence that the cost of litigation is low for plaintiffs and that
plaintiffs' counsel can spread any costs and risks across their overall portfolio. Id. Beisner
and Borden cite to Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Para-
digms from Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 125, 127 (2003). Rowe in turn, how-
ever, offers no evidence and, indeed, contends generally that class actions would not be
viable without contingency fees and fee shifting. Id. at 127-33.
Similarly unsupported is Beisner and Borden's claim that the cost of discovery for defend-
ants can run into "the tens of millions of dollars." BEISNER & BORDEN, EXPANDING, supra, at
16. To substantiate this assertion, Beisner and Borden cite to Eric Van Buskirk, Raging
Debate: Who Should Pay for Digital Discovery?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 2003, available at http://www.
risk-averse.com/index files/dd.pdf, who in turn cites to Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris
Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (2002). In Rowe, the defendants estimated the cost of recover-
ing electronic data in response to a discovery request at $10 million, but the plaintiffs
estimated the cost at $24,000 to $87,000. Id. at 425, 427. The court ordered the plaintiffs to
pay part of the expense of responding to the request. Id. at 433. Even as an anecdote for
the high cost of discovery for defendants this example is highly dubious. It has been cited,
however, as if it was a fact. See, e.g., Corinne Bergen, Generating Extra Wind in the Sails of the
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mate competitive behavior.3 0 For these and related reasons many
prominent members of the antitrust community, even those not a part
of the Chicago School on antitrust matters,3 1 have called for the cur-
tailment of private enforcement in significant ways.3 2 Some even call
EU Antitrust Enforcement Boat, 5J. INr'L Bus. & L. 203, 222 n.145 (2006) (citing BEISNER &
BORDEN, EXPANDING, supra).
Much the same is true for the claim that class counsel receive high fee awards but the class
receives little of value, see, e.g., id. at 218 (citing Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of
Antitrust Rules-Modernization of the EU Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. Rv.
431, 437 (2004) (making this assertion unsupported by citation or example)), or that class
cases are often brought without a meritorious basis. See, e.g., Gary D. Ansel, Admonishing a
Drunken Man: Class Action Reform, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 451, 454, 455 (2003) (relying on
'war-stories" and "hearsay" and providing no examples of frivolous lawsuits).
Also questionable is evidence for the assertion that defendants regularly settle class actions
simply to avoid the risk of an erroneous, catastrophic loss. Along these lines, a version
available on the Internet of an amicus brief for the Chamber of Commerce includes the
following quotation: "A 1995 study of more than 400 class actions brought in four U.S.
districts showed that in one of those districts, the Southern District of Florida, every class
action was settled." Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23(f) at 6, Gilchrist v. State Farm, 390 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-90047-E).
However, the empirical study that serves as a basis for this claim reveals that the sample in
the Southern District of Florida consisted of only six cases and that, on the whole, the
settlement rate was slightly over seventy percent. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVI-
SORY COMMITrEE ON CIVIL RULES 29-31 (1996), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$file/rule23.pdf. As others have pointed out, this settlement
rate is about the same as in general litigation. See, e.g., Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Explod-
ing the Black Mail Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681,
697 (2005). Also without ultimate empirical basis are the judicial assertions that class certi-
fication coerces defendants into settling. See, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249
F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). Moreo-
ver, there is an odd asymmetry in the judicial concern about vulnerable corporations-
what about victims who are unable to pursue their legal rights against large corporations
simply because their individual claims are not large enough to warrant litigation?
None of this establishes that critics of private litigation and class actions are wrong and
surely some of their anecdotes are correct. It does suggest, however, that their claims have
not been proven.
30. Turner, supra note 29, at 811-12.
31. For example, Harvard Professor Donald Turner called for the replacement of
mandatory treble damages by a system that imposed it only when "the law was clear at the
time the conduct occurred" and "the factual predicates for liability are clear." Id. at 812.
32. For example, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp writes that treble damages and attor-
ney's fees for victorious plaintiffs give plaintiffs too great an incentive to sue: "As a result
many marginal and even frivolous antitrust cases are filed every year, and antitrust litiga-
tion is often used as a bargaining chip to strengthen the hands of plaintiffs who really have
other complaints." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXE-
CUTION 59 (2005). Professor Hovenkamp does not, however, give data that supports his
conclusions.
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for the complete abolition of private rights of action.33 FrC Chair Wil-
liam Kovacic succinctly summarized the prevailing view of the anti-
trust profession as follows: "[P]rivate rights of action U.S.-style are
poison. They over-reached dramatically. And we have to use substan-
tive liability standards to push back on what we think are hard-wired
elements of the private rights of action mechanism."3 4
While these criticisms are longstanding and widespread, they
have been made without any systematic substantive or empirical ba-
sis.3 5 Those who point to the perceived flaws of private antitrust en-
forcement typically offer only anecdotes, some of which are
questionable, rather than provide reliable and rigorous data to sup-
port their arguments.3 6 Indeed, the same point applies to attacks on
33. For example, Professors Elzinga and Breit would "replace the entire damage-in-
duced private actions approach with a system of fines (well in excess of current levels). This
proposal would eliminate the perverse incentives and misinformation effects and repara-
tions costs. Public enforcement has the advantage of separating incentives for enforcement
from the penalty itself." William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement:
The New Learning, 28J.L. & ECON. 405, 440 (1985) (citations omitted). Professors Elzinga
and Breit do not, however, provide data to support their conclusions.
34. WASH. REGULATORY REPORTING Assocs., FTC:WATCH No. 708, at 4 (quoting Wil-
liam E. Kovacic, speaking at an ABA panel on Exemptions and Immunities) (on file with
author). Chair Kovacic has also made the point elsewhere that the very existence of the
treble damages remedy, which is perceived as punitive, causes "the adjustment by the
courts of the malleable features of the U.S. antitrust system to offset perceived excesses in
characteristics (e.g., mandatory trebling of damages and availability of jury trials) ....
[T] he method of equilibration is to alter liability rules." William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual
DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firn Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double
Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 62; see also Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to
Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J.
1065, 1088-98 (1986) (describing the relationship between private treble damages actions
and the evolution of substantive antitrust liability standards).
35. One prominent critic, former ABA Antitrust Section Chair Jan McDavid, candidly
admits this. She asserted: "[The] issue [of class action abuse] was never directly presented
in these cases, but many of these issues arise in the context of class actions in which the
potential for abusive litigation is really pretty extraordinary." Antitrust and the Roberts Court,
22 ANTITRUST 8, 12-13 (2007).
Professor Andrew Gavil then asked McDavid and other lawyers participating in the discus-
sion, "What empirical bases do you have for any of those assumptions, other than your
personal experience largely as defense lawyers?" Id.
McDavid replied, "I am not aware of empirical data on any of those issues. My empirical
data are derived from cases in which I am involved." Id.
A Professor at Columbia Law School, C. Scott Hemphill, added, "The Court's attention to
false positives relies upon a somewhat older theoretical literature. I'm not aware of a sizea-
ble empirical literature making the point." Id.
36. For example, Michael Denger, former Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section, wrote:
"Substantial windfalls go to plaintiffs that are not injured or only minimally injured."
Michael L. Denger, Chair, Remarks at the 50th Anniversary Spring Meeting of the ABA
Antitrust Section 15 (Apr. 24-26, 2002). Mr. Denger, however, provides no data to prove
his assertions, or any citations to scholarly articles containing such data. He does not even
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private litigation generally-critics tend to make factual assertions
without an adequate empirical basis. We emphasize that we are not
disputing that the anecdotes the critics use may raise important con-
cerns about abuses in particular cases. Private antitrust enforcement
certainly is not perfect.37 The contention of this Study is, however,
that a valid assessment of the net efficacy of private antitrust enforce-
ment, which accounts in most years for more than ninety percent of
filed antitrust cases,38 is possible only by also systematically consider-
provide a single supporting anecdote. He also fails to address any of the well-known deter-
rence-related benefits of private enforcement or show why society would be better off if
antitrust violators were permitted to keep their windfalls.
Antitrust Modernization Commission ("AMC") Commissioner Stephen Cannon wrote:
[P]rivate plaintiffs act in their own self-interest, which may well diverge from the
public interest. Private plaintiffs are very often competitors of the firms they ac-
cuse of antitrust violations, and have every incentive to challenge and thus deter
hard competition that they cannot or will not meet. If the legal system were
costless and errorless, these incentives would pose no problem. However, litiga-
tion is expensive and courts and juries may erroneously conclude that procompe-
titive or competitively neutral conduct violates the antitrust laws. Under these
conditions, private plaintiffs will bring suits that should not be brought and that
deter competitively beneficial conduct. They know that defendants often will be
willing to offer significant settlements rather than incur substantial litigation costs
and risks. Since potential defendants know this too, they will refrain from engag-
ing in some forms of potentially procompetitive conduct in order to avoid the
cost and risk of litigation.
W. Stephen Cannon, A Reassessment of Antitrust Remedies: The Administration's Antitrust Reme-
dies Reform Proposal: Its Derivation and Implications, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 103, 106 (1986).
AMC Commissioner Jonathan Jacobson co-authored the following observations:
For the weaker firm suing the stronger firm, the suit may be a way of sensitizing
the stronger firm so that it will not undertake any aggressive actions while the suit
is outstanding. If the stronger firm feels itself under legal scrutiny, its power may
be effectively neutralized. For large firms suing smaller firms, private antitrust
suits can be veiled devices to inflict penalties. Suits force the weaker firm to bear
extremely high legal costs over a long period of time and also divert its attention
from competing in the market. Or, following the argument above, a suit can be a
low-risk way of telling the weaker firm that it is attempting to bite off too much of
the market. The outstanding suit can be left effectively dormant through legal
maneuvering and selectively activated (inflicting costs on the weaker firm) if the
weaker firm shows signs of misreading the signal.
Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-one Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the Alley with
Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST LJ. 273, 277 n.40 (1998) (quoting
MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 85-86 (1980)). However, Jacobson and Greer do
not provide systematic data to support their conclusions.
37. Of course, there is no reason to think government enforcement is perfect. For
those who believe in the importance of the antitrust laws, it is therefore important to com-
pare the role that private antitrust enforcement has played with the role that government
enforcement has played.
38. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online:
Antitrust Cases filed in United States District Courts by Type of Case, 1975-2006, http://
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412006.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). For the most
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ing its benefits to victimized consumers and businesses, and to the
economy and the public interest more generally.
1H. The Purpose and Design of This Study
This Study is a first step towards providing the empirical data nec-
essary to assess some of the benefits of private antitrust enforcement.
Toward this end, the Study analyzes a group of forty recent, successful,
large-scale private antitrust cases. To our knowledge no similar study
has ever been undertaken.
Nevertheless, we note at the outset that this Study does not pur-
port to be comprehensive or in any way definitive. It does not analyze
every recent significant private antitrust case, assess a random sample
of private cases, or even include all of the largest or "most important"
ones.39 Through paper and electronic searches, website searches, and
discussions with antitrust attorneys, we have simply tried to assemble
and evaluate some of the largest and most beneficial private antitrust
cases that have reached resolution since 1990.
Of the cases we considered, we did not include some because ac-
quiring the necessary information would have been too difficult or
time consuming. Other cases were so recent that we have not yet been
able to tell the precise value of the relief.40 We excluded still other
recent reported year, 96.3% of all antitrust cases filed were private cases. In only nine out
of thirty-two years reported did the percentage of private cases fall below ninety percent.
The lowest reported percentage was 83.4. Id.
39. For example, we were unable to include an analysis of the consumer class action
suits against Microsoft or the private cases against Microsoft by AOL Time Warner, even
though a highly respected journalist reported that together these cases recovered more
than $2 billion for victims of antitrust violations. See Todd Bishop's Microsoft Blog, http://
blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/microsoft/archives/104794.asp (July 7, 2006, 06:50 PST). All
of the damages figures analyzed in this Study were generated by ourselves and our re-
searchers, and their methodology is reported in ROBERT H. LANDE & JOSHUA P. DAVIS,
BENEFITS FROM ANTITRUST PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: FORTY INDIVIDUAL CASE STUD-
IES (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1105523. The
only exception is for the Vitamins cases, where we used the estimates generated by Profes-
sorJohn M. Connor, for United States private cases only. SeeJOHN M. CONNOR, THE GREAT
GLOBAL VITAMINS CONSPIRACY: SANCTIONS AND DETERRENCE 131, at tbl.18 (2008) (on file
with authors).
40. For example, the California Microsoft settlement is difficult to value in large part
because the relief is not yet final. Settlement Agreement, In re Microsoft I-V Cases, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 660 (Ct. App. 2006) (J.C.C.P. No. 4106). Because the California consumers in that
case settled primarily for vouchers available on a "claims made" basis, the actual value of
the settlement is yet to be determined. Id. at 31. At a maximum, if every voucher is ulti-
mately redeemed, Microsoft will pay out $1.1 billion in cash. Id. at 17. However, even if no
claims are made by the class, $733 million in vouchers and technology support will go to
California public schools as part of a cy pres distribution. Id. at 31-42.
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cases because they produced benefits that were mostly injunctive in
nature and, while they may have yielded tremendous benefits to con-
sumers or to the United States economy, these benefits are difficult to
quantify or substantiate. We also did not include any cases that were
dismissed or were otherwise unsuccessful, or cases that yielded only
"small" recoveries, even though in certain contexts a recovery of, say,
$5 million should be considered a tremendous victory for the public
interest. 41 Rather, we defined success simply in terms of plaintiffs ei-
ther winning a favorable decision in court or obtaining a substantial
settlement. Moreover, we have surely missed many successful cases
and, for purposes of drawing lines and to save time, simply omitted
cases that concluded before 1990 or that produced less than approxi-
mately $50 million in cash benefits. Finally, we made no attempt to
ascertain what proportion of all private cases can be defined as suc-
cessful, unsuccessful, or somewhere between the two.
The primary focus of this project, moreover, was not to demon-
strate that private litigation often has established important legal
precedents; other studies have done this convincingly.42 Our goal was,
instead, to look for recent private cases that are final, including ap-
41. For example, in Pease v. Jasper Wyman & Son, 845 A.2d 552 (Me. 2004), plaintiffs
won a $56 million verdict in a case that involved a conspiracy to suppress the price of wild
blueberries. Pease v. Jasper Wyman & Son, No. CV-00-015, 2004 WL 4967228, at *1 (Me.
Super. Jan. 2, 2004). Plaintiffs also won significant non-monetary relief that restructured
anticompetitive pricing methods in the industry. Settlement Agreement at 10, Pease, 2004
WL 4967228, at *1. To avoid industry-wide bankruptcy, the plaintiffs settled with the buy-
ers' cartel for roughly $5 million. Id. at 11-12. This case was a purely private action. To our
knowledge there was never a government enforcement action.
42. For an excellent analysis, see Stephen Calkins, Coming to Praise Criminal Antitrust
Enforcement, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION
OF CARTELS 343 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2007).
Professor Calkins found that, of leading antitrust cases decided before 1977, twelve were
private and twenty-seven were government. Id. at 353. Of the leading cases decided 1977 or
later, however, he found thirty private cases and only fifteen government cases. Id. at 354.
Professor Calkins took as his sample the leading cases printed in the leading antitrust
casebook.
Professor Calkins concluded:
Today what is known as U.S. antitrust law no longer is exclusively or even princi-
pally the consequence of Justice Department enforcement. The leading modern
cases on monopolization, attempted monopolization, joint ventures, proof of
agreement, boycott, other horizontal restraints of trade, resale price mainte-
nance, territorial restraints, vertical boycott claims, tying, price discrimination,
jurisdiction, and exemptions are almost all the result of litigation brought by
someone other than the Justice Department.
Id. at 355 (citations omitted).
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peals, and that recovered at least $50 million. 43 We have no reason to
believe that the cases examined in this Study were more or less likely
to establish important legal principles than other private cases. It
might well be that many cases recovering far less than $50 million, or
cases securing only injunctive relief (or, indeed, no relief at all), estab-
lished more important legal principles.
IV. The Results of This Study
A. Recovery in the Forty Cases
Table 1 shows that the forty cases (or groups of cases) 44 analyzed
in this Study provided a cumulative recovery in the range of at least
$18.006 to $19.639 billion in allegedly45 illegally acquired wealth to
United States consumers and businesses. 46 All of this was cash-prod-
ucts, services, discounts, coupons, and injunctive relief were not in-
cluded in this total.47 Of this, more than $5.706 to $7.056 billion came
from foreign companies that violated United States antitrust laws. Ta-
ble 2 shows that eighteen of the forty cases involved this kind of recov-
43. Some of the cases included in this Study did, however, establish important legal
principles. See, e.g., ROBERT H. LANDE &JOSHUA P. DAVIS, BENEFITS FROM ANTITRUST PRIVATE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: FORTY INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES (2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 105523 (Fructose, Cardizem, and Terazosin
case summaries). Note: The cases analyzed in this Study are referred to by short names
(e.g., "Fructosd') for brevity. For a full list of the cases analyzed and their formal citations,
see infra Appendix II.
44. To arrive at this number we counted related cases as being a single "case." For
example, there have been many separate cases involving vitamin cartels, brought by differ-
ent plaintiffs and often against different groups of defendants.
The vitamins cases could have been reported as two cases if, for example, the direct pur-
chaser and indirect purchaser actions were analyzed separately. Alternatively, we could
have reported that there were three primary categories of vitamins affected, so the vitamins
cases could have been counted as three cases, or as six cases if these were each divided into
direct and indirect purchaser cases. Alternatively, each vitamin case could have been re-
ported separately. However, this Study analyzes and counts them all together as one "case."
See LANDE & DAVIS, supra note 43, at 234 (Vitamins case summary).
45. For simplicity, we are calling the charges "allegations" even though many were
proven in court.
46. We did not change recoveries to 2008 dollars or otherwise correct for the time-
value of money. All figures include the awarded attorney's fees.
Although a verdict would produce treble damages for victims, almost all of our cases in-
volved settlements, and in none of the cases did a court determine the size of the damages.
It is possible that some of these settlements were for an amount that exceeded the harm
done from an antitrust violation, in which case the amount in excess of that harm could
not readily be described as illegally acquired wealth. We know of no way to determine,
however, whether any of the settlements exceeded single damages.
47. Securities were counted in one case because they had a readily ascertainable mar-
ket value.
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ery. This means that without the private enforcement of the antitrust
laws this money would have remained with foreign lawbreakers in-
stead of being returned to the United States consumers and busi-
nesses from which it was taken.48
Table 1: Recoveries in Private Cases 49
Case Recovery ($ millions)
Airline Ticket Commission 86
Litigation
Auction Houses 452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully
redeemable coupons)
Augmentin 91
Automotive Refinishing Paint 106
Buspirone 220
Caldera 275



















48. This project did not select cases on the basis of whether a foreign defendant was
likely to be involved. The selection criteria used were whether $50 million or more was
paid to victims of the antitrust violation and the date of the completion of the litigation.
49. The results in every Table in this Article have been rounded to the nearest million
dollars.
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Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258
Total 18,006 to 19,639
B. A Comparison of Deterrence from Private Enforcement and
DOJ Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws
As noted in Part I, in addition to compensating victims of anti-
trust violations, private enforcement also has the goal of deterring fu-
ture antitrust violations. While it is extremely difficult to measure the
deterrence effects of private actions, by at least one measure they are
quite significant. This is because the amount recovered in private
cases is substantially higher than the aggregate of the criminal anti-
trust fines imposed during the same period.
Table 1250 shows the criminal antitrust fines imposed in DOJ
cases since 1990 (the period covered by this Study).51 The fines total
$4.232 billion for all cases combined (notjust for the cases analyzed in
our Study).52
Since one of the goals of the antitrust system is optimal deter-
rence of anticompetitive behavior,5 3 it is fair to compare the $18.006
50. See infra Appendix I.
51. A very small mismatch may exist because the DOJ operates on a fiscal calendar.
52. This total includes both corporate and individual fines. See Table 12 infra Appen-
dix I for our methodology.
53. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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Table 2: Recoveries from Foreign Cartels and Monopolies
Case Recovery ($ millions)
Auction Houses Virtually all of the 452 wasrecovered by United States citizens
Augmentin 91
Automotive Refinishing Paint 31
Cardizem 110










Relafen Unknown amount-much of 250;




Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258
Total 5,706 to 7,056
billion (at a minimum) paid in private litigation5 4 to the $4.232 billion
paid in criminal fines. 55 Measured this way, private litigation provides
more than four times the deterrence of the criminal fines.56
54. See Table I supra Part IV.A.
55. See Table 12 infra Appendix I.
56. This ratio might need to be adjusted for net present value because government
fines occur more quickly than private recoveries, but such an adjustment would be small
and would not affect our conclusions. We also note that we are comparing the deterrence
effect of United States government criminal efforts to private litigation, and we do not
consider the effect of fines imposed by foreign governments. We are grateful to John Con-
nor for raising these issues. Professor Jonathan Baker raises the possibility that potential
cartelists could, depending upon the information known to the various parties in a market,
take the possibility they will have to pay damages into account when they set their prices.
To the extent this occurs often, it would greatly complicate the optimal deterrence analy-
sis. SeeJonathan B. Baker, Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damages Reme-
dies, 4J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 385 (1988).
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It is arguable, however, that it would be more appropriate to com-
pare the actual criminal fine total only to those cases in our Study that
did result in a criminal fine or prison sentence. This way we would be
certain that the compared cases would be of the same type as the ones
that contributed to the DOJ fine total. As Table 11 shows,57 the same
antitrust violations that resulted in some criminal penalties to the af-
fected cartels also gave rise to private cases that caused payouts to vic-
tims that totaled between $6.171 and $7.521 billion.
Regardless of which figure we use, we may safely conclude that
the private cases provided far more deterrence than the criminal anti-
trust fines. Even the lowest figure of $6.171 billion in private payouts is
significantly greater than the total for criminal fines of $4.232 billion
and, as noted, the total private enforcement figure for the forty stud-
ied cases58 was more than four times as large.
Prosecutions by the DOJ also result in prison sentences, and these
of course significantly deter illegal activity as well. If we want to fairly
compare the deterrence effects of private antitrust enforcement with
that by the government, we must take prison time into account. Even
when we do, however, the deterrence effect of private enforcement is
far greater than the deterrence effect of the DOJ's criminal
prosecutions.5 9
Since 1990, criminal antitrust prosecutions by the DOJ have re-
sulted in sentences that aggregate to 428.6 years of prison time.60
There is, unfortunately, no objective way to compare the deterrence
effect of time spent in prison to the deterrence effect of a criminal
fine, and different people would trade off jail and fines in different
ways. Any "average" figure used to equate the two necessarily is specu-
lative and arbitrary. 61
57. See Table 11 infra Appendix I.
58. As noted earlier, this Study's analysis did not include many large and significant
private enforcement actions. Nor does our analysis attempt to set a value to the public of
important precedents that were established by either private or government cases. Interest-
ingly, Professor Calkins's analysis shows that thirty of the forty-five most important prece-
dents decided since 1977 have come from private litigation. See Calkins, supra note 42.
59. Our analysis does not take into account injunctive relief, whether obtained by the
DOJ or private litigation. It is unclear how this additional consideration might alter the
comparison, if it would at all.
60. See Table 12 infra Appendix I.
61. See Joseph C. Gallo et al., Department ofJustice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An
Empirical Study, 17 Rv. INDUs. ORG. 75, 128 (2000), for a brief discussion of the literature
comparing the deterrence effects of fines and imprisonment. The authors mention ten
different analyses that compare or discuss the tradeoffs between fines and imprisonment.
Id.
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We note, however, scholarship by two distinguished teams of
economists that attempted to "value"jail incarceration in this context.
A 1988 article by Professors Howard P. Marvel, Jeffry M. Netter, and
Anthony M. Robinson equated a fine of $25,000 to a month in jail for
an antitrust offense. 62 Adjusting their estimate of $300,000 per year
for inflation would mean equating a year in jail to slightly less than
$600,000 today. 63 Similarly, a 1994 article by Professors Kenneth
Glenn Dau-Schmidt, Joseph Gallo, Charles Parker, and Joseph
Craycraft equated a year in jail with a fine of $1 million.64 If this esti-
mate were adjusted for inflation, it would be almost $1.5 million
today. 65
Under the conservative assumption that a sentence (not the ac-
tual time served 66) of a year of incarceration has the same deterrence
effect as a $5 million fine, 67 the collective 428.6 years ofjail sentences
received by antitrust defendants would be the equivalent of $2.143
billion in criminal fines.
Since the total DOJ criminal antitrust fines during this period
were approximately $4.232 billion, the total deterrence effect of the
DOJ criminal fines and prison sentences together, since 1990, has
been approximately $6.4 billion. This is far less than the more than
62. Howard P. Marvel et al., Price Fixing and Civil Damages: An Economic Analysis, 40
STAN. L. REv. 561, 573 (1988). The article appeared in the February 1988 issue, so we
assume they were using 1987 dollars.
63. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator equates
$300,000 in 1987 to $547,570 in 2007. They do not have a figure for 2008. See Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/
cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
64. See Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt et al., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A
Study of Law and Economics, 16 REs. L. & ECON. 25, 58 (1994).
65. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator equates
$1,000,000 in 1994 and $1,399,070 in 2007. This calculator does not include figures for
2008. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 63. Professors Dau-Schmidt et al. were using
1982 data for much of their paper's analysis. If they meant their valuation of a year in jail to
be expressed in 1982 dollars, since $1,000,000 in 1982 dollars is the equivalent of
$2,148,620 today, perhaps it would be fair to ascribe this higher figure to them. Dau-
Schmidt et al., supra note 64.
66. The DOJ reports only the amount of time to which defendants are sentenced. See
Table 12 infra Appendix I. We do not know how much of this time defendants actually
served, Because our calculations use incarceration sentences rather than actual incarcera-
tion times, our methodology implicitly values incarceration time as being worth much
more than the nominal figures used in our calculations. Moreover, we treat various forms
of confinement, including house arrest, as equivalent to incarceration. This no doubt over-
states the deterrence effect of the DOJ's efforts.
67. We believe that the deterrence effect of being sentenced to a year of confinement
is likely significantly less than $5 million, but we make this very high assumption because
we do not want to select a figure that reasonably could be criticized as being too low.
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$18 billion total defendants paid to victims in the forty cases we
studied. 68
Indeed, even if we used $10 million for the equivalent value of a
year's imprisonment (an estimate we believe is much too high), the
value of DQ sanctions would total only $8.5 billion, less than half the
amount recovered by private plaintiffs in the cases we studied.
Although the above figures can be analyzed in several different
ways, it is safe to conclude that private enforcement is significantly
more effective at deterring illegal behavior than DOJ criminal anti-
trust suits. We did not expect that our project would show this result.
C. Private Antitrust Litigation Does Not Just Follow Criminal
Government Enforcement
While we certainly were aware that private antitrust cases often do
not follow from government investigations, we were somewhat sur-
prised at the high representation of private actions that were filed in
the absence of government cases or that significantly expanded the
relief obtained through government enforcement alone. It is espe-
cially interesting that of the total amount recovered almost half-at
least forty-three to forty-seven percent; $7.631 to $8.981 billion-came
from the fifteen cases that did not follow federal, State, or EU govern-
ment enforcement actions.69 For each of the cases listed in Table 3,
the private plaintiffs completely uncovered the violations, and initi-
ated and pursued the litigation, with the government following the
private plaintiffs' lead or playing no role at all. Another $4.212 billion
came from cases with a mixed private/public origin. 70
68. We have not adjusted either the DOJ figures or the private recoveries for inflation.
In light of the robustness of our comparison, however, doing so should not make a differ-
ence in our conclusions.
69. For conduct that gave rise to both government and private litigation, we tried to
untangle cause and effect as accurately as possible. For many cases our researchers spent
dozens of hours on this issue alone. However, because government investigations can pro-
ceed for many months or even for years before the enforcers file suit, their records are
confidential, and the enforcers typically do not reveal or discuss their investigations or
what piece or body of evidence prompted them to file suit, we could not always make
definitive classifications.
70. See Table 5 infra Appendix 1. For example, In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000), started as a result of a different private antitrust
suit, which led to a government investigation in the polypropylene carpet market, that in
turn led to the private litigation analyzed in this Study. See Table 5 infta Appendix I for
other examples.
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Table 3: Private Litigation Not Preceded by Government Action















Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258
Total 7,631 to 8,981
Note: In some cases we have not been able to determine whether private
or public action came first, or arose simultaneously or in a mixed fashion. We
did not include these cases in this Table. Some private cases were uncovered
as a result of a government investigation into a different conspiracy, but we
excluded these cases from this Table as well.
There also were cases whose origin we could not definitively as-
certain. 71 In many of these cases, only the private actions achieved a
successful result. Still other private cases followed a government inves-
tigation, but provided significantly greater relief than the government
action (if, indeed, the government brought it), expanded the scope of
inquiry and claims, or obtained relief against parties not included in
the government actions. 72 Moreover, the fourteen private cases that
also involved criminal fines from government prosecutions recovered
a total of $6.171 to $7.521 billion for victims. 73
Thus, not only were many cases not follow-ons, but many of these
cases arose and proceeded in a wide and unpredictable range of ways,
71. See LANDE & DAvis, supra note 43, at 77-87 (El Paso case summary).
72. See Table 6 infra Appendix I. For example, in Linerboard, the FTC charged one
firm with a unilateral violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, but the private case involved an
entire alleged cartel.
73. See Table 11 infra Appendix I.
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often involving a complex interplay between the federal government,
States, and various classes of private plaintiffs. Indeed, there might be
a very complicated general interaction between public and private an-
titrust enforcement. It could well be the case that private victories or
losses in one type of case (e.g., bundled rebate cases or predatory pric-
ing cases) affect similar or related government cases in different in-
dustries, or vice versa. For this reason it is possible that curtailing
private litigation might undermine antitrust enforcement in ways that
would be extremely difficult to predict.
D. Types of Plaintiffs That Recovered: Direct Purchasers, Indirect
Purchasers, and Competitors
Of the total $18.006 to $19.639 billion in recoveries we analyzed,
$12.088 to $13.438 billion, in thirty-two cases, was recovered by direct
purchasers; $1.815 billion, in six cases, was recovered by indirect pur-
chasers; and $4.028 to $4.311 billion, in six cases, was recovered by
competitors.7 4 This means that direct purchasers obtained roughly
sixty-seven to sixty-eight percent of the total recoveries we studied.
This also means that indirect purchasers only recovered nine to ten
percent of the total; less than one-sixth as much as direct purchasers.
Table 4: Recoveries by Category of Plaintiff
Direct Indirect Competitor
Case Result Case Result Case Result
Augmentin 62 Augmentin 29 Conwood 1,050
Lysine 50 Lysine 15 Sun 700
Auction Real- 478 to
Houses 452 Vitamins 204 Networks 761
AutomotiveRefinh 106 Paxil 65 Caldera 275Refinishing
Buspirone 220 Relafen 75 IBM 775







74. See Table 4 infra.




























12,088 to 1,815 4,028 toTotal 13,438 4,311
Note: The El Paso settlement was recovered mostly, but not entirely, by
indirect purchasers. We have not been able to segregate the small amount of
recovery by direct purchasers.
In addition, it should be noted that NCAA 75 involved a monopsony by direct
purchasers. The Airline Tickets Commission76 case also involved collusion by buyers.
75. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010 (1998).
76. In reAirline Ticket Comm'n Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20361 (D. Minn. Aug.
12, 1996).
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E. Types of Cases: Per Se and Rule of Reason
Fourteen of the forty cases dealt with conduct that was governed
solely by the rule of reason, which netted at least a combined $8.182
to $8.465 billion for victims. 77 In addition, of the twenty-five per se
cases, 78 three (Insurance, Airline Ticket Commission, and Cardizem) did
not involve the traditional, hard-core per se categories of naked price
fixing or bid rigging. Two other cases involved both per se and rule of
reason claims. 79 We would have predicted that a higher percentage of
the forty cases followed directly from hard-core per se offenses. Fur-
ther, and perhaps not surprisingly, all but six of the cases were class
actions. 80
F. Non-Monetary Relief
Some of the cases we analyzed also involved substantial non-mon-
etary relief. For example, one case generated coupons, fully redeem-
able in cash if not used for five years (however, to be very conservative
we did not count any part of this as a "cash" recovery).81 Another case
resulted in a $125 million rate reduction for consumers (we did not
count this reduction in our benefits total).82 Some cases involved ex-
tremely useful cy pres grants. 8 3 Many other cases restructured indus-
tries in ways that, according to the judge presiding over the litigation,
provided improvements for competition even more beneficial than
the monetary relief they conferred on the plaintiffs (even in cases
where that monetary relief was quite large). For example, the Visa/
MasterCard case was settled in April 2003 for "$3,383,400,000 in com-
77. See Table 8 infra Appendix I.
78. See Table 9 infra Appendix I.
79. See Table 10 infra Appendix I.
80. Although we did not intend this Study to focus particularly upon class action liti-
gation, the requirement of court approval of class action settlements enabled us to obtain
information that often is not available in individual settlements, the terms of which often
are confidential. Final verdicts are, of course, publicly available for individual cases, but
these are rare in the antitrust field. See Connor & Lande, supra note 22, at 513 app. at 565.
81. See LANDE & DAVIs, supra note 43, at 13-18 (Auction House case summaries). These
coupons traded for a value that reflected their discounted present value. Id. at 18. They
also comprised twenty percent of the legal fees paid to the prevailing attorneys, who said
that they will redeem them for cash after the expiration of the mandatory five year period.
Id.
82. See id. at 77-87 (El Paso case summary).
83. See, e.g., id. at 110 (Insurance case summary). This case resulted in a cash settle-
ment with a creative remedy that: (i) funded the development of a public entity that pro-
vides risk management, education, and technical services to small businesses, public
entities, and non profits; and (ii) funded the States for development of a risk database for
municipalities and local governments. Id.
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pensatory relief, plus additional injunctive relief valued at $25 to $87
billion or more. '8 4 Similarly, NASDAQ decreased the spreads received
by market makers,8 5 the Insurance litigation eliminated restrictions on
insurance policies,8 6 and NCAA eliminated caps on pay to college
coaches.8 7 Further, the generic drug cases-Buspirone,8 8 Cardizem,89
Oncology (Taxol),9 0 Re/afen,91 Rmeron,92 and Terazosin 3-discouraged
collusion between brand name and generic drug manufacturers, sav-
ing consumers many millions, perhaps even billions, of dollars in
lower cost drugs.9 4
G. Awards of Attorney's Fees
An analysis of the attorney's fees awarded in these cases provides
a more interesting and complex picture than is generally recognized.
The amounts awarded varied, of course, based in large part upon the
opinion of the presiding judge about the quality of the legal represen-
tation, the risks involved, and the success of the case. In a significant
number of cases, the courts determined that the exemplary work of
counsel and other factors warranted an award of one third of the re-
covery.95 In other cases, particularly those involving recoveries of
more than $500 million, counsel requested, and the court awarded, a
much smaller percentage of the fund.96 A point rarely appreciated is
that plaintiffs' counsel often exercised significant self-restraint in
84. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa USA & MasterCard Int'l, 396 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir.
2005).
85. See LANDE & DAvis, supra note 43, at 131-34 (NASDAQ case summary).
86. See id. at 110-13 (Insurance case summary).
87. See id. at 135-39 (NCAA case summary).
88. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Bus-
pirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
89. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000), affd,
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
90. Vista Healthplan, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C.
2003).
91. In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass. 2004).
92. In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005).
93. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
94. See LANDE & DAvis, supra note 43, at 31-39 (Buspirone case summary), 45-55
(Cardizem case summary), 155-60 (Oncology (Taxol) case summary), 183-92 (Relafen case
summary), 193-98 (Remeron case summary), and 212-20 (Terazosin case summary); see also
Table 7C infra Appendix I.
95. Tables 7A and 7B show that, for the thirty cases where we were able to ascertain
the attorney's fee percentage, nine cases involved an award of a third of the recovery, and
eight cases involved an award of thirty to thirty-two percent of the recovery. See Tables
7A-B infra Appendix I. By contrast, three of the five actions recovering more than $500
million resulted in attorney's fee awards of only five to seven percent. Id.
96. Id,
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these cases-the amount of the award reflected a request by class
counsel of a relatively small percentage of the fund.9 7 And, of course,
an analysis of the fees awarded in these successful cases does not re-
flect others in which private counsel lost, recovered nothing for their
time, and received no compensation or reimbursement for their sub-
stantial expenditures, often including hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars in expert witness fees and other costs. 9 8
H. Judicial Praise for Plaintiffs' Counsel
In the cases we analyzed, the judges generally expressed great sat-
isfaction with the efforts of the plaintiffs' counsel that appeared
before them. For example, in her opinion approving the final settle-
ment in the direct purchaser Cardizem case, 99 Judge Nancy G. Ed-
munds awarded class counsel their full request of attorney's fees-
thirty percent of the total recovery of $110 million-noting that the
award was justified by their "excellent performance on behalf of the
Class in this hotly contested case."10 0
Similarly, the Honorable Michael M. Mihm, the judge who over-
saw the Fructose litigation, 1° 1 repeatedly praised class counsel.
I've said many times during this litigation that you and the attor-
neys who represented the defendants here are as good as it gets.
Very professional .... You've always been cutting to the chase and
not wasting my time or each others' time or adding to the cost of
the litigation. And this was very difficult litigation .... Skill and
efficiency of the attorneys. As good as it gets. Complexity and dura-
tion of the litigation. It was very complex. We made some new law
on more than one occasion .... 102
97. In El Paso, for example, plaintiffs' counsel received six percent of the common
fund as an attorney's fee award, but that was the amount that they requested. See LANDE &
DAvis, supra note 43, at 77 (El Paso case summary).
98. In considering an appropriate contingent fee award, it is necessary to take into
account the high proportion of contingent fee cases that do not result in any award to the
attorneys. Unlike defense attorneys, who are normally paid by the hour, a system of contin-
gent fees depends upon a portfolio of cases where the small number of large winners
offsets the large number of cases in which there is a small fee, or no fee at all.
99. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
100. Order Granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs' Motions for Final Approval of Settle-
ment, Plan of Allocation and Sherman Act Class Counsel's Joint Petition for Attorney's
Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named Plaintiffs at 21, In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff'd, 332 F.3d 896
(6th Cir. 2003).
101. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 936 F. Supp. 530 (1996).
102. Transcript of Record at 45-46, In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., id.
(No. 95-1477). He accordingly awarded class counsel twenty-five percent of the settlement
fund in fees, in addition to costs, the precise amount that class counsel requested. Id.
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Chief Judge Thomas Hogan in one of the vitamins cases stated in
his opening remarks to the jury pool: "l[T] his is a very challenging and
interesting case .. involving, I think, some of the finest business liti-
gating lawyers or litigation-type lawyers in the country that are before
you that you will have the privilege to listen to.' 0 3 After the jury re-
turned a verdict of $49.5 million in damages for the class plaintiffs,
Chief Judge Hogan thanked the jurors for their service and stated:
"[T] his is a serious case, and you had the pleasure of having very ex-
cellent lawyers on both sides appear before you. 10 4
V. Conclusion
The distinctive system of private enforcement we have in this
country is substantially underappreciated. Congress's venerable "pri-
vate attorneys general" idea t0 5 has produced tremendous benefits for
the United States economy-for consumers and for businesses of all
sizes. Private antitrust enforcement is virtually the only way that vic-
tims of anticompetitive behavior can obtain redress: in the cases we
studied, lawbreakers or alleged lawbreakers were forced to return ap-
proximately $18-$20 billion to victimized consumer and business pur-
103. Transcript of Record at 25:1-6, In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig. v. BASF AG, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6869 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2004).
104. Id. at 1520:8-10. There are numerous other examples of complimentary remarks.
The judge in Automotive Refinishing Paint noted that "[p]laintiffs' counsel have repeatedly
demonstrated their skill in managing" the litigation. In re Auto Refinishing Paint Antitrust
Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29162, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004). The court in Buspirone
stated, "Let me say that the lawyers in this case have done a stupendous job." Milberg, LLP,
Why Milberg?, http://www.milbergweiss.com/whymilberg/whymilberg.aspx?strNav=fir...
Nav&Page=/firm/firm.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (citing Final Approval Hearing Tran-
script at 34:2-3, In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Califor-
nia Attorney General Bill Lockyer praised private counsel in El Paso, noting they "were well-
financed and expert litigators, bringing particular credibility to the [settlement] negotia-
tions," and stating, "Class counsel were crucial to bringing [the settlement] to fruition."
LANDE & DAViS, supra note 43, at 87 (El Paso case summary). The court in Linerboard made
repeated comments to the effect that "the lawyering in the case at every stage was superb."
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2004 WL 1221350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004). The
court in Relafen lauded "the exceptional efforts of class counsel" and pointed out that the
settlement was "the result of a great deal of very fine lawyering on behalf of the parties." In
re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 80 (D. Mass. 2005). The court in Remeron noted
that "[the settlement entered with Defendants is a reflection of Class Counsel's skill and
experience." In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27013, at *37 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005).
105. The federal antitrust laws permit a private right of action, awarding treble dam-
ages as well as attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). By establishing
this framework, designed to encourage victims to sue violators, these laws create "private
[A] ttorneys [G] eneral," providing incentives to pursue private litigation in the public inter-
est. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
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chasers. More than $6 billion of this otherwise would have remained
in the hands of foreign lawbreakers.
Private enforcement also deters anticompetitive behavior signifi-
candy. Indeed, the forty studied cases helped deter anticompetitive
behavior more than all the criminal fines and prison sentences im-
posed in cases prosecuted by the DOJ during this period. Moreover,
almost half of the studied violations or alleged violations were uncov-
ered solely by private counsel, and in many other cases, private coun-
sel played a large role in uncovering and proving the offense.
These private attorneys general-lawyers representing businesses,
farmers, individuals, or classes of consumers who believe they have
been injured by antitrust violations-often work thousands of hours
and lay out millions of dollars in the course of prosecuting antitrust
litigation, time and costs which are reimbursed only if they prevail.
Their work has saved the United States taxpayer tremendous sums in
enforcement costs by shifting the enormous burdens and risks of liti-
gating against sophisticated, well-financed lawbreakers to private
plaintiffs' counsel. Private enforcement has often substituted for fed-
eral and state action entirely when government did not act at all or
did not achieve meaningful results. Private actions have also comple-
mented governmental enforcement in many situations where the gov-
ernment investigated, prosecuted, and imposed penalties, but was
unable to compensate private victims for the harms they suffered as a
result of antitrust violations. Private antitrust enforcement has also re-
structured many industries in ways that have improved efficiency and
competitiveness, redounding to the benefit of consumers, the affected
industries themselves, and the economy as a whole. 10 6
In fact, there are many reasons to believe that these private anti-
trust actions complement government enforcement of the antitrust
106. As Irwin Stelzer observed,
An army of private enforcers, enlisting help from attorney-entrepreneurs free to
accept cases on a contingency fee basis, freed of "loser pays" obligations, is an
important supplement to those limited resources. In America, the number of pri-
vate actions brought under the antitrust laws historically had exceeded by ten
times the number brought by the government. True, many of these follow suc-
cessful government-initiated actions, but it is also true, according to the estimate
of one scholar, that some 80% of court decisions establishing important princi-
ples (not all of which I find agreeable, I might add) in the competition policy
area have resulted from private actions.
Irwin Stelzer, Notes for Talk at Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law
Sponsored by Office of Fair Trading: Implications for Productivity Growth in the Economy
2 (Oct. 19, 2006), available at http://stelzerassoc.com/Speeches/Implications%20for%20
Productivity%20Growth%20in%2Othe%2OEconomy%20OFr%200ct%2019,%2006.pdf.
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laws in important ways. Indeed, private enforcement may be every bit
as essential as public enforcement. As a practical matter, the govern-
ment cannot be expected to do all or even most of the necessary en-
forcement for various reasons including: budgetary constraints; 10 7
undue fear of losing cases;' 08 lack of awareness of industry condi-
tions; 0 9 overly suspicious views about complaints by "losers" that they
were in fact victims of anticompetitive behavior;110 higher turnover
among government attorneys;"' and the unfortunate, but undenia-
ble, reality that government enforcement (or non-enforcement) deci-
sions are, at times, politically motivated.' 12 One would expect a
107. This is especially true in the current climate of tight federal budgets. Critics of
private enforcement never explain where, if private actions were abolished, the substantial
amount of money would come from to replace the resources that otherwise would be spent
by the private enforcers. Nor do they discuss the deleterious effects on deterrence and
victim compensation that curtailing private enforcement would bring.
108. Professor Calkins notes:
Governmental agencies also hesitate to litigate because of fear of defeat. Court-
room setbacks can demoralize agency staff, raise questions in the eyes of observ-
ers, and impose political costs. Few agency annual reports boast about the well-
fought loss, and, in an era in which governmental accountability is fashionable, it
is challenging to characterize losses as accomplishments. All too often, agencies
worry about their win rates.... [T]he Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice boast about the rate at which
merger challenges are successfully resolved; and general counsels who are nomi-
nated for higher office like to claim that their agency won a high percentage of its
cases. Everyone wants a good batting average. Unfortunately, a single loss can
ruin a good batting average compiled with few at-bats. It is one thing to lose one
of many cases; it is considerably more devastating to lose a third, half, or more of
one s cases.
Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The Second Annual Bernstein Lecture, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1998) (citations omitted).
109. "Private parties operating in the real markets ... [will] act on the reality they
confront." Stelzer, supra note 106, at 4. "The administrators of our antitrust laws ... might
not feel competent to tell what sort of pricing practice is exclusionary or predatory. But the
victims most certainly can." Id. at 5.
110. Of course, many do not believe this. "[Wiho better to argue that . . . [certain
conduct is anticompetitive] than a competitor, injured by illegal anticompetitive practices,
conversant in the technical jargon, on the sharp edge of customer relations, well informed
of the details and consequences of the dominant firm's practices." Id. at 5-6.
111. The largest antitrust cases often last for five to ten years. The government often
has trouble retaining a well-qualified team for this long a period. Private firms, by contrast,
often are able to retain relatively intact teams for longer periods.
112. Stelzer noted:
A less obvious but equally important reason that private enforcement is so impor-
tant is that it is free of direct political influence. In America, administrations
come and go, some more given to a jaundiced view of the activities of dominant
firms than others, witness the soft settlement worked out with Microsoft when the
Bush administration took office and control of the Department ofJustice, and its
current disinclination to file any Section 2 cases.
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vigorous private antitrust regime, then, to confer significant benefits
over and above those conferred by a system reliant solely upon gov-
ernment enforcement.
Moreover, under the current legal system it is striking that not
only is the conduct that results in criminal antitrust violations greatly
under-deterred, but there is simply no good way for the government,
by itself, to optimally deter most conduct that is illegal but does not
give rise to criminal penalties.
The anticompetitive conduct that does give rise to criminal anti-
trust violations currently occurs far too frequently and is almost cer-
tainly significantly underdeterredt13-even factoring in the effects of
the present system of private litigation. A fortiori this conduct would
be even more underdeterred if private litigation were eliminated or
substantially curtailed.
The effects of any significant curtailment or repeal of private
rights of action on conduct that does not result in criminal violations
might, however, be even more inimical to the public interest. As a
remedy for this conduct divestiture, as a practical matter, almost never
occurs, and while an injunction can stop future anticompetitive behav-
ior, it puts violators in a no-lose situation (unless there also is the pros-
pect of private litigation). Even if defendants lose their case and have
to stop the practices in question, an injunction alone would permit
them to keep the fruits of their past anticompetitive behavior. Opti-
mal deterrence under the current regime is not possible without the
prospects of private litigation.
Indeed, private litigation actually does a better job than the gov-
ernment in advancing the primary goal of the government's enforce-
ment program: deterring illegal corporate behavior. The forty cases
analyzed in this study, by themselves, provide greater deterrence
against anticompetitive behavior than all the DOJ imposed criminal
fines and prison sentences since 1990.114 This is remarkable consider-
Stelzer, supra note 106, at 2; see also WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTER-
EST-GROUP POLITICS 36 (1990). Each of the two antitrust agencies is subject to separate
influences. See id. at 83, 93. The Antitrust Division is part of the executive branch, so the
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust reports to the Attorney General and, indirectly, to
the President. See id. at 83. The FTC enjoys the independence from direct executive con-
trol associated with its special status, but it may be correspondingly more prone to congres-
sional influence and interference. See id at 93. The agency is supposed to respond to
proper congressional oversight, but ensuring that oversight is proper is no easy task.
113. See Lande, supra note 23; Connor & Lande, supra note 22.
114. See supra Part V.B.
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ing that these forty cases were only a portion of all private cases initi-
ated during this period.
Notwithstanding the substantial benefits of private antitrust en-
forcement, negative assertions about the efficacy of private litigation
have been very well publicized. This might be due in part to the pow-
erful economic interests that stand to benefit from a curtailment of
private antitrust enforcement and, ultimately, from lax enforcement
of the antitrust laws.
However, the frequent and high praise from judges when they
approved these settlements, concerning both the settlements them-
selves and the lawyers involved in bringing the violators to justice, be-
lies the possibility that these cases and settlements were not in the
public interest. It also adds to the certainty that these cases were desir-
able and that the settlements significantly assisted the victims of anti-
trust offenses. Moreover, the amount of these settlements is far
greater than the cost of defending litigation-suggesting that defend-
ants were responding to a real risk of liability in agreeing to pay dam-
ages rather than merely seeking to avoid the cost of the litigation
itself.
In contrast to negative assertions about private antitrust enforce-
ment, the benefits of private enforcement tend to be underreported
and underappreciated. They deserve much more public attention and
acknowledgement. This Study is a first step toward recognizing those
benefits empirically.
Because our cases were not randomly selected, it is difficult to
generalize from our conclusions. Our sense is that our results would
hold up if a larger or random sample were examined, and it is our
hope that our project will encourage future researchers to test our
sample's validity against different and larger data bases. However, to
the extent these conclusions are likely to be representative, they
should be helpful for antitrust policymaking. 1i 5
115. Moreover, this Study focused only on successful private actions. One of this
Study's major shortcomings is that it ignored meritorious antitrust cases that the private
bar did not pursue. It is possible that for every successful antitrust case, there was another
case where victims suffered significant losses that never were recovered, whether because
damages were too small to warrant a private action, because denial of class certification
rendered such a prosecution impractical, or for some other reason. These cases might well
have aided victims of illegal behavior if they had been viable. Our Study could not, of
course, measure the benefits of these never-brought cases, and for this reason might signif-
icantly understate the harms to consumers and the economy from antitrust violations.
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Appendix I
The following tables provide a summary of key information about
the antitrust cases included in this Study. All results were rounded to
the nearest million dollars:
Table 5: Cases with a Mixed Private/Public Origin
Case Recovery ($ millions)
Drill bits - private suit led to
government investigation which 53
prompted this suit
Flat Glass - DOJ investigation but
no indictment or civil proceeding 122
ever initiated by government
Fructose - uncovered by
government action, but no 531
indictments
Polypropylene Carpet - conduct
uncovered in different private case, 50
to DOJ investigation, to private
case
Urethane - grew out of a
government investigation into a 73
conspiracy involving a different
chemical
Visa/MasterCard - unclear which
investigation began first, although
private action was filed well before 3,383
government action and addressed
different conduct.
Total 4,212
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Table 6: Private Recoveries that Were Significantly Broader
than the Government Enforcement Action (in addition to all
of the compensation to victims noted in Table 1) (does not
include the cases in Table 3 that were not preceded by a
government action)
Reasons Why Private Remedy Was
Case Significantly Broader than
Government Remedy
Government investigation yielded no
Automotive Refinishing Paint indictments; private cases got
$106 million.
Private plaintiffs obviated need for
El Paso separate government action seeking
monetary recovery.
Fructose Government did not indict
antitrust violators.
Private plaintiffs provided compensation
Insurance and contributed to restructuring ofindustry, eliminating restrictions on
insurance and reinsurance.
FTC action was against one firm for
Linerboard unilateral conduct; the private case
involved a conspiracy.
Private plaintiffs obtained greater
Polypropylene Carpet monetary recovery and prosecuted larger
number of defendants.
No federal case; state governments
Relafen intervened only after settlement-privateplaintiffs provided the compensation
to victims.
Private plaintiffs made broader
allegations than United States
Sun v. Microsoft government action, obtained informationthat supported later European action,
and protected distribution of "pure"
Java softvare.
ySteel Private action included longerSpecialty Stime period.
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Table 7A: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney's Fees for
Recoveries Less than $100 Million
Case ($ millions in the recovery) Attorney's Fee Percentage
Airline Ticket Commission (86) 33.3
Augmentin (91) 21.6 (weighted average of direct






Drill Bits (53) 30.8
Polypropylene Carpet (50) 33.3
Sorbates (96) 22-33
Terazosin (74) 33.3
Microcrystalline Cellulose (50) 33.3
Specialty Steel (50) 30
Lysine (65) 7
Commercial Explosives (77) 30
Graphite Electrodes (47) 15
Table 7B: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney's Fees for
Recoveries Between $100 Million and $500 Million
Case ($ millions in the recovery) Attorney's Fee Percentage




Flat Glass (122) 32
Linerboard (202) 30
Oil Lease (193) 25
Paxil (165) 20 & 30
Relafen (250) 33
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Table 7C: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney's Fees for
Recoveries Exceeding $500 Million
Case ($ millions in the recovery) Attorney's Fee Percentage
Visa/MasterCard (3,383) 6.5
5.2 (plaintiffs' attorneys got 20% of
Auction Houses (552) their fee in coupons-the samepercentage that class members got
of their recovery in coupons)
El Paso (1,427) 6
Fructose (531) 25
NASDAQ (1,027) 13
Table 8: Recoveries in Rule of Reason Cases







Paxil - Section 2 165
Platinol - Section 2 50
RealNetworks 478 to 761
Relafen - Section 2 250
Remeron - Section 2 75
Sun 700
Taxol - Section 2 66
Visa/MasterCard 3,383
Total 8,182 to 8,465
Note: Insurance, Airline Ticket Commission, Cardizem, and Buspirone
charged per se violations, but they were not hard-core price-fixing or bid-
rigging cases. Several cases charged both per se and rule of reason violations.
They were not included in this Table.
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Table 9: Recoveries in Per se Cases
Case Recovery ($ millions)
Airline Ticket Commission 86
Litigation
Auction Houses 452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully
redeemable coupons)
Automotive Refinishing Paint 106





















Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258
Total 9,227 to 10,577
Note: The Polypropylene Carpet settlement was preceded by another
private suit that alleged both rule of reason and per se violations.
Spring 2008]
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Table 10: Recoveries in Mixed Cases
Case Recovery ($ millions)
Buspirone 220
El Paso 1,427 (plus 125 in uncounted rate
reductions)
Total 1,647
Note: While the plaintiffs in Buspirone alleged that the defendants'
patent infringement settlement was actually a horizontal market allocation
and therefore per se illegal, the case was settled before the court decided this
issue. However, the Cardizem court declared a similar agreement a per se
violation.
Table 11: Recoveries for Cases with a Criminal Penalty as Well
Case Recovery ($ millions)














Vitamins 3,908 to 5,258
Total 6,171 to 7,521
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Table 12: Total United States Criminal Antitrust Fines from
1990-2007
The following figures are, as noted, from a variety of different
sources published at different times. We found results for some years
from some sources that contradicted results given by different
sources, for reasons we could not determine. The figures in the fol-
lowing table are our best attempt to reconcile these sometimes con-
flicting data sources. The totals include both corporate and individual
fines.




















116. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1990-1996, at
11 (on file with author); U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS
FY 1998-2007, at 12, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.pdf.
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Appendix II
The following is a list of the cases included in this Study and the re-
searchers who analyzed them.' 17
1. In Re Airline Ticket Comm'n Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20361 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1996). Tara Shoemaker
2. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15327 (2d Cir. July 30,
2002); Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
Douglas Richards
3. Ryan-House v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33711 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2005); SAJ Distribs., Inc., v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., No. 2:04cv23 (E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 30, 2004) (Augmen-
tin). Michael Einhorn
4. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 177 F. Supp. 2d
1378 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Maarten Burggraaf & Andrew Sullivan
5. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), final settlement approval, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26538 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 17, 2003). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom
6. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.
Utah 1999). Tara Shoemaker & Erica Dahlstrom
7. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D.
Mich. 2000), affd, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). Morgan Anderson
8. In re Citric Acid Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal.
1998). Bobby Gordon
9. In re Commercial Explosives Litig., 945 F. Supp. 1489 (D.
Utah 1996). Ruthie Linzer
10. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.
2002). Erika Dahlstrom
11. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust
Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006). Erika
Dahlstrom
12. Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III & IV: Sweetie's v. El
Paso Corp., No. 319840 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); Conti-
nental Forge Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC237336 (L.A. Super. Ct.
filed Sept. 25, 2000); Berg v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC241951 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 18, 2000); City of Long Beach v. S. Cal. Gas Co.,
No. BC247114 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); City of L.A. v. S.
117. See LANDE & DAVIS, supra note 43, for complete case analyses.
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Cal. Gas Co., No. BC265905 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); Phil-
lip v. El Paso Merchant Energy LP, No. GIC 759425 (San Diego Super.
Ct. filed Dec. 13, 2000); Phillip v. El Paso Merchant Energy LP, No.
GIC 759426 (San Diego Super. Ct. filed Dec. 13, 2000) (El Paso). Erin
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